Final Questions

Final will contain 20 out of the following 24 questions:

  1. Find all pure Nash equilibria in a given finite two-player game.
  2. Find all pure Nash equilibria in a given finite multiplayer game.
  3. Find all pure strict Nash equilibria in a given finite two-player game.
  4. Find all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria in a given two-player game where each player has only two strategies.
  5. List all strictly dominating strategies in a given game.
  6. List all weakly dominating strategies in a given game.
  7. List all strictly dominated strategies in a given game.
  8. List all weakly dominated strategies in a given game.
  9. Find all maxmin pure strategies of a given two-player game.
  10. Find all maxmin mixed strategies of a given two-player game.
  11. Find all minmax strategies of a given two-player game.
  12. Find all minmax mixed strategies of a given two-player game.
  13. Find all minmax regret strategies of a given two-player game.
  14. Find all epsilon-Nash equilibria of a given two-player game.
  15. Find subgame perfect equilibrium in an extensive form game.
  16. Find values of the discount factor for which given strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium in a given iterative game.
  17. Draw a Moore machine representing a given strategy in an iterative game.
  18. Given a potential function of a two-player game. Construct an example of a potential game with the given potential function.
  19. Given a potential game, find its potential function.
  20. Find a Nash equilibrium of a given congestion game.
  21. Give a social network and a set of agents who received free samples, find all agents who eventually will adopt the product.
  22. Given a social welfare function, decide if it satisfies properties of a) unanimity, b) independence of irrelevant alternatives c) dictatorship.
  23. Given an epistemic model, decide which of the given epistemic formulae are true in which of the epistemic worlds of the model.
  24. Decide which of the given epistemic principles are universally true.