Final will contain 20 out of the following 24 questions:

- Find all pure Nash equilibria in a given finite two-player game.
- Find all pure Nash equilibria in a given finite multiplayer game.
- Find all pure strict Nash equilibria in a given finite two-player game.
- Find all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria in a given two-player game where each player has only two strategies.
- List all strictly dominating strategies in a given game.
- List all weakly dominating strategies in a given game.
- List all strictly dominated strategies in a given game.
- List all weakly dominated strategies in a given game.
- Find all maxmin pure strategies of a given two-player game.
- Find all maxmin mixed strategies of a given two-player game.
- Find all minmax strategies of a given two-player game.
- Find all minmax mixed strategies of a given two-player game.
- Find all minmax regret strategies of a given two-player game.
- Find all epsilon-Nash equilibria of a given two-player game.
- Find subgame perfect equilibrium in an extensive form game.
- Find values of the discount factor for which given strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium in a given iterative game.
- Draw a Moore machine representing a given strategy in an iterative game.
- Given a potential function of a two-player game. Construct an example of a potential game with the given potential function.
- Given a potential game, find its potential function.
- Find a Nash equilibrium of a given congestion game.
- Give a social network and a set of agents who received free samples, find all agents who eventually will adopt the product.
- Given a social welfare function, decide if it satisfies properties of a) unanimity, b) independence of irrelevant alternatives c) dictatorship.
- Given an epistemic model, decide which of the given epistemic formulae are true in which of the epistemic worlds of the model.
- Decide which of the given epistemic principles are universally true.